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ABSTRACT

Park, Gilchan. M.S., Purdue University, December 2013. Text-based Phishing Detection
Using a Simulation Model. Major Professor: Julia Taylor.

Phishing is one of the most potentially disruptive actions that can be performed on the
Internet. Intellectual property and other pertinent business information could potentially
be at risk if a user falls for a phishing attack. The most common way of carrying out a
phishing attack is through email. The adversary sends an email with a link to a fraudulent
site to lure consumers into divulging their confidential information. While such attacks
may be easily identifiable for those well-versed in technology, it may be difficult for the
typical Internet user to spot a fraudulent email.

The emphasis of this research is to detect phishing attempts within emails. To date,
various phishing detection algorithms, mostly based on the blacklists, have been reported
to produce promising results. Yet, the phishing crime rates are not likely to decline as the
cyber-criminals devise new tricks to avoid those phishing filters. Since the early non-text
based approaches do not address the text content of the email that actually deludes users,
this paper proposes a text-based phishing detection algorithm. In particular, this research
focuses on improving upon the previously published text-based approach. The algorithm
in the previous work analyzes the body text in an email to detect whether the email
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message asks the user to do some action such as clicking on the link that directs the user
to a fraudulent website. This work expanded the text analysis portion of that algorithm,
which performed poorly in catching phishing emails. The modified algorithm generated
considerably higher results in filtering out malicious emails than the original algorithm
did; but the rate of text incorrectly identified as phishing, which is the FPR, was slightly
worse. To address the FP problem, a statistical approach was adopted and the method
ameliorated the FPR while minimizing the decrease in the phishing detection accuracy.

The studies in this research make use of a simulation model technique to illustrate the
algorithms. The simulation model visualizes the overall process of the analysis and yields
graphical and statistical results that are used to conduct the experiments. In addition,
since the simulation model operates in the environment controlled by a user, using the
simulation model allows the user to easily apply modified concepts for experiments. This
simulation feature was utilized to find and eliminate the unnecessary factors in the
algorithm, and therefore the optimal performance time was measured.

Keywords: PhishNet-NLP, POS, actionable words, text analysis, text score, AnyLogic
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1

Motivation

Phishing is a malicious use of Internet resources carried out to trick Internet users
to reveal personal information, such as usernames, credit card information, and Social
Security numbers to the attacker. Phishing can appear through a variety of
communication forms such as instant messaging, SMS, VOIP, online messenger, and
above all the most common form of phishing attack leverages email. Fraudsters send an
email to an unsuspecting user that contains a link to a domain that is seemingly legitimate
in the hopes that the users will input their private information for the attacker to steal
(DigiCert, 2009).

There is no doubt phishing can be extremely damaging all organizations since
tricking a user within a business network through a phishing scam is an easy way to
obtain the user’s information in order to gain access to that business network. According
to the RSA 2012 annual fraud report, the total number of phishing attacks in 2012 was 59%
higher than 2011 (RSA, 2012). Global losses from phishing were estimated at $1.5 billion
in 2012. That amount of damage is a 22% increase from 2011. The report estimated
losses from phishing in 2013 would exceed $2 billion. The following graph in the figure
1.1 shows the number of phishing attacks per year.
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Figure 1.1 Phishing Attacks per Year
(source: adapted from APWG, 2013)

Phishing can also have a large impact on individual Internet users. According to
the APWG report, among the top-level domains (TLDs) the .COM namespace contained
the most unique domain names used for phishing as well as having the highest number of
attacks within the namespace in the quarter of year 2013 (APWG, 2013). This would
suggest that a large number of phishing attacks targeted typical Internet users and not
corporations. This conclusion is particularly harmful, as typical Internet users have many
user accounts on various websites that could be exploited, including accounts for banking,
social media, and email. Imperva, a data security company, suggests that users use
different passwords for each Internet website that they frequent in order to prevent
multiple sets of credentials from being compromised in an attack (Imperva, 2010).
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Typical Internet users may not follow such suggestions for proper password management,
increasing the potential compromised accounts if a phishing scheme is successful.

To figure out the reasons why people fall for phishing attacks, Dhamija et al
conducted the study designed to see people to identify a variety of websites as legitimate
or fake (Dhamija et al, 2006). The participants consisted of 22 university students and
staffs, and the results found that only two participants correctly classified phishing
websites as the forged sites. Most of the participants simply believed the copied
webpages themselves. Five participants only considered the contents of the webpages to
judge its authenticity, without considering any other aspects of the browser such as the
URL. About 50-75% of phishing domain names tend to have the name of the brand they
are targeting within the URL used (McGrath & Gupta, 2008). The study by Dhamija et al.
also stated that most careful and knowledgeable users could even fall for the attacks using
very simple techniques, such as copying images of browser chrome or the SSL indicators
in the address bar or status bar (Dhamija et al, 2006). Due to the ubiquity of the Internet,
users on the Internet have a wide range of technical expertise (Hinde, 1998). This means
that there are a large number of credulous Internet users with less technical understanding
that could fall victim to such attacks. According to Sheng et al., the most vulnerable age
group to phishing attacks is between ages 18 and 25, and this age group is susceptible due
to the lack of education, the lack of experience on the Internet, less exposure to training
resources, and insensitivity to risks (Sheng et al., 2010). In their study, they provided the
participants with a good anti-phishing education to see the effects of such education. The
training reduced 40% in the phishing susceptibility; however, the participants still fell for
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the 28% of phishing messages and some training materials let the participants hesitate for
clicking the actual legitimate links (Sheng et al., 2010).

The threat phishing poses to Internet users at large calls for action within the
information security industry to create ways of detecting and preventing such attacks.
Research into the area of phishing detection has yielded several types of email analysis to
determine if an email should be classified as phishing.

First, link or URL analysis refers to the using information about the links included
within an email to detect the email used in a phishing attempt. This approach usually
involves checking to see if the displayed link in the email matches the actual website
URL that the user is taken to if the link is clicked, or examines the patterns in URLs in an
email in order to compare to the features of phishing URLs. Garera et al. (2007) found
the most frequent words in URLs in phishing emails, and their classifier checked if URLs
had any of those tokens. Another early work by Ma et al. (2009) analyzed the host-based
properties identified by the URL. For example, this algorithm checked the time-to-live
(TTL) value for the DNS records associated with the hostname. The drawback of the
methods based on URL analysis is the vulnerability to the phishing emails containing the
URLs in new forms. Phishers started to use auto-generated system to produce a different
URL each time. In addition, the URL analysis is based on heuristics, and the techniques
using heuristics often produce the high FPR (incorrectly labeling legitimate emails as
phishing).
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The second well-known phishing detection approach is blacklisting, which is the
most popular and widely-deployed techniques in industry. Blacklist is a set of wellknown phishing websites and addresses reported by trusted entities such as Google's and
Microsoft's blacklist (Gaurav et al, 2012). PhishTank, a well-known website containing a
blacklist, utilizes a wisdom-of crowds approach in order to collect phishing sites
(PhishTank, 2013). People report potential phishing sites to the PhishTank website, and it
is decided whether the submissions are indeed phishing scams by people’s vote (Hong,
2012). PhishTank has received more than 7 million votes since October 2006. For
blacklisting, both a client and a server side are necessary. The client component's
implementation can be completed through an email or browser plug-in that communicate
with a server component. The server component is a public website containing a list of
phishing sites (Tout & Hafner, 2009). At first, the blacklisting technique seemed
promising. However, it is a time-consuming and extremely demanding task to preserve a
list of trustworthy sources, and this technique also has a potential threat to produce FP,
which falsely classifies legitimate websites as phishing (Lalitha & Udutha, 2013). In
addition, the blacklisting technique can be simply exposed to the threats by future
unidentified cases, and is especially vulnerable to automatically generated URLs (Hong,
2012). For instance, the tricky phishers started to adopt sophisticated techniques such as
the phish toolkits to generate plenty of unique phishing URLs used by the notorious
hacking group known as the Rock Phish Gang, and this toolkit hindered blacklisting
techniques to correctly detect phishing scams (Xiang et al., 2009).
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Other previous works also took an approach based on either the blacklisting
(Prakash et al., 2010, Zhang et at., 2008) or the analysis of URL features (Le et al., 2011).
Popular web browsers such as Google, Firefox also deployed the blacklist-based
technique to detect phishing scams (Schneider et al.,2007). The anti-phishing toolbars
including Google Safe Browsing (Google, 2013), NetCraft (Netcraft, 2013), SpoofStick
(CoreStreet, 2007), SiteAdvisor (McAfee, 2013) and EarthLink Toolbar (EarthLink, 2013)
are blacklist-based alike. Although the methods above proved their merits generating a
blacklist or listing the features of phish URLs, skillful criminals can elude these nonrobust (non-resisting) properties.

1.2

Objective

The research in this thesis aims to report on an experiment into text-based phishing
detection using publicly available resources. There have been a number of approaches to
block phishing attempts to lure people to malicious websites, and the reports affirmed
that their algorithms were capable of filtering out the phishing scams in a highly
successful phish detection rate. Despite those efforts, the phishing is still threatening us,
and the seriousness becomes even worse. Since those previous algorithms did not
emphasize on the contents of the text in an email, which actually deceived people, the
text-based algorithms proposed in this paper examine text in an email to recognize
phishing scams.

The developed algorithms in this thesis use previously published work on the, socalled PhishNet-NLP, a content based phishing detection system, as a starting point. In
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particular, this research focuses on the text analysis portion of PhishNet-NLP that uses
natural language techniques. The original text analysis produced relatively poor results in
both TPR and FPR compared to the other analyses of PhishNet-NLP. Thus, the main
purpose of this research is to expand the text analysis portion and improve the
performance so as to fill in the gap left by the other techniques. Another objective of this
study is to optimize the performance of the modified algorithms in terms of the phishing
detection accuracy and processing time.

To build the model of the proposed algorithms, the studies make use of the
AnyLogic simulation modeling tool described in the section 2.3. The AnyLogic
simulation model animates the specific analytic processing and produces graphical results
after the completion of analysis. Using the simulation model allows to easily control the
parameters, and therefore the different performance times and phishing detection rates
can be measured by changing the concepts for the algorithm. Finally, the most effective
environment for both the processing time and the performance on catching phishing
emails can be found.

1.3

Thesis Organization

Chapter 1: Introduction — provides background information in phishing scams and
PhishNet-NLP to introduce the motivation for doing further research on PhishNet-NLP.
This introduction chapter also contains the objective of this study.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review — describes the definitions of the phishing, the types of
phishing attacks, the simulation modeling and the AnyLogic simulation software tool.
This chapter also explains three different content-based phishing detection algorithms
proposed in the past including PhishNet-NLP.

Chapter 3: Proposed Approach — specifically explains how the text score is generated in
PhishNet-NLP and discusses the expanded algorithm. This chapter also states the
assumptions, the implementation details, and the data set.

Chapter 4: Simulation Results and Discussion — describes the simulation procedures and
presents the results of the proposed approach. This chapter also introduces a methodology
to reduce the FPR increased by the modified algorithm, and discusses the results of the
methodology.

Chapter 5: Conclusion and Future Work — proposes the conclusion of this research, and
discusses the issue of this research and the possible future works to ameliorate the
problem.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1

The origin of Phishing

Phishing is a criminal act which uses a combination of "social engineering and
technical subterfuge" to steal user information (APWG, 2013). The idea of "phishing"
first was presented in a 1987 conference called Interex (Robson, 2011). The origin of the
word "phishing" comes from the analogy that malicious Internet users lure to "fish" for
credential information from the sea of Internet user by using email (APWG, 2004). The
Internet of "phishing" was first mentioned on the alt.2600 hacker newsgroup in January
1996, or the term could have started to be used in the earlier printed edition of the hacker
newsletter "2600". In the 1996, the term "phishing" started to be used to describe the
incidents that hackers were exploiting passwords from unsuspecting America On-Line
(AOL) user to steal AOL accounts. Nowadays, the term has been expanded to include
various attacks to target personal information (Milletary & Center, 2005).

The term is obviously derived from "fishing" and is always spelled with "ph" to
differentiate it from the origin, and possibly to emulate phone "phreaking". Considering
the definition of phishing, the derivative noun, "phisher," refers to the perpetrator of the
crime. Hackers replaced "ph" with "f", and the original form of hacking is known as
"phreaking". The word "phreaking" was first adopted by the first hacker, John Draper
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who devised the infamous Blue Box by which he was able to hack telephone systems in
the early 1970s (APWG, 2004). It is believed that this first hacking form known as
"Phone Phreaking" is the origin of the "ph" spelling in hacker organizations. Stolen
accounts by criminals were called "phish" by 1996, and phish started to be traded
between hackers. The number of phishing attacks has been dramatically increasing, and
criminals are expanding the area of their activity from simply stealing AOL accounts to
targeting users of online banking and e-commerce sites (APWG, 2004).

2.2

Types of Phishing Attacks

Phishing attacks can be classified into several types by the way of attacks. This
section introduces what kinds of phishing schemes have been developed.

Spear phishing is targeted phishing using data gathered through outside means,
such as user names. The specific targets can be companies and government agencies, and
the criminals send spoofed email messages misrepresenting the phishers as people from
the recipient’s company or organization, such as a human resources department (Bank,
2005). Jagatic et al. (2007) conducted experiments with how to take advantage of the
personal information from social networks, and the research showed that people tended to
more fall for the phish when the email came from the person in their contacts. The
fraudsters visit popular social network sites such as MySpace, Facebook, and LinkedIn to
exploit Internet users' relationships and common interests.
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When spear phishing is used against the rich and powerful targets such as
executives of corporations in order to gain the most corporate information, the type of
attack is called "whaling" (Markoff, 2008). According to the report by Markoff, the chief
executive of an antispam company received an email and fell for the phishing scam, and
several other high level targets received the similar attack. From late 2010 to early 2011,
victims of the successful spear phishing attacks include RSAsecurID, the Canadian
government, the Austrailian Prime Minister and other ministers (Hong, 2011).

Pharming is more dangerous technique in that pharmers make use of an email that
simply damages the victim once the email is opened by the receiver. Since the pharming
email contains stealth applications such as virus, Trojan horses that are automatically
installed in the user’s computer, the user may not even notice his or her personal
information stored in the computer in danger unless antivirus programs catch the
malicious applications (Hicks, 2005). The installed applications have a role to redirect the
browser to the counterfeit sites when the user visits the official website of an organization.
The oblivious user provides the id and password to login the website without realizing the
website is the fake webpage created by the criminal. As a result, the pharmer harvests the
personal information that the victim divulges (Hicks, 2005).

2.3

Simulation Modeling and AnyLogic

AnyLogic is a multi-methods simulation modeling tool developed by XJ
Technologies. Modeling is one of the ways to solve real-world problems. In the majority
of cases, we cannot afford to find the right solutions by experimenting with real objects
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which is very expensive, or just impossible. The whole modeling thing can be defined as
experiments in a risk-free world where it is allowed to make mistakes and control
variables in the environment so as to find the most appropriate way to deal with the issue
(Grigoryev & Borshchev, 2012).

As a way of modeling technology, simulation model is an executable model to
analyze dynamic systems. Simulation model is based on a set of rules and the rules can
take a variety of forms such as differential equations, state charts, process flowcharts, and
schedules. As the simulation model runs, it shows its current process and model's output.
Building a simulation model is conducted by the special software tools that use
graphically and textually simulation specific languages (Grigoryev & Borshchev, 2012).

Simulation modeling has advantages. First, a simulation model's structure reflects
the system's structure since simulation models utilize visual languages, and it helps
communicate the model's internal to others. Second, measurements and statistical
analysis can be added to a simulation model at any time. Third, the ability to play and
animate the system behavior in time is a simulation's great merit. Animations are useful
for demonstrations, verification and debugging. Lastly, a simulation is a great medium to
convey proposals. The simulation's visualization will have an advantage over those who
only use numbers (Grigoryev & Borshchev, 2012).

AnyLogic is one of the special software tools for simulation modeling. AnyLogic
is based on Java programming language, and the native Java environment in AnyLogic
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provides various features to interact with Java code, libraries, and data from outside.
Since it is possible to use Java code at any place in the AnyLogic model, the
programmers can adjust their models to meet their needs (Emrich, Suslov, & Judex,
2007). AnyLogic also provides an extensible statistical distribution function set.
AnyLogic has the numerical solver automatically at runtime in accordance with the
activities of the model (Zauner, Leitner, & Breitenecker, 2007). This function set can be
used to generate visual and statistical results along with animation functions. Furthermore,
AnyLogic offers the interface of creating interactive animations, including elementary
graphical shapes, various types of indicators and graphs. It also provides plentiful API for
creating sophisticated animations (Karpov, Ivanovski, Voropai, & Popov, 2005).

2.4

Previous Content based Phishing Detection Techniques
2.4.1 Phish Mail Guard

Phish Mail Guard is a phishing mail detection system using textual and URL
analysis and a phishing detection method which is a combination of blacklist, white list
and heuristic (Hajgude & Ragha, 2012). The DNS analyzer component in the system
determines whether the email is phishing or non-phishing by analyzing visual DNS and
actual DNS in the email. If the DNS of the hyperlink is present in blacklist, email is
considered as phishing. If it is present in white list, email is considered as non-phishing.
Blacklist contains a list of known fake DNS and the white list holds a list of known valid
DNS. The DNS analyzer module is implemented using those lists to select a technique
for further examination.
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If the DNS of the hyperlink in the email does not fall into either of the blacklist or
the white list, the heuristic detection process takes over the next step. The heuristic
module has text and URL algorithms. For the text algorithm, the body text in an email is
parsed into tokens and the tokens are compared to blacklisted token. If the numbers of
matched tokens that are blacklisted token pass the threshold, the email is considered
phishing. In the URL algorithm, link URL in body text is parsed into tokens and
compared with blacklisted features from URL. For example, the numbers of @ symbol,
the length of the hostname and the IP address in the URL are counted. By the same token,
if the number of matched tokens is more than threshold, it is considered phishing. The
overall process of the Phish Mail Guard is described in the figure 2.1 below.

Figure 2.1 The overall process of Phish Mail Guard
(source: adapted from Hajgude & Ragha, 2012)

In this research, the authors suggested the hybrid phishing detection algorithm,
and expected that their new approach would be able to catch phishing emails significantly
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better than the previous work. As for the potential problem of the Phish Mail Guard, the
heuristic module in Phish Mail Guard can yield the high FPR since the textual and URL
analysis within the heuristic process are technically based on the blacklists which have
several issues described in the previous section 1.1. Although the researchers mentioned
that FPR could be reduced by using the DNS, link, and textual contents analysis, it is
believed that they did not verify their algorithm by experiment since any specific data and
results of their proposed algorithm were not present in the paper. Therefore, the potential
problem on FPR still remains until the Phish Mail Guard is actually proved to reduce
FPR.

2.4.2 CANTINA
CANTINA is a content based approach for detecting phishing web sites (Zhang,
Hong, & Cranor, 2007). CANTINA used TF-IDF and the Robust Hyperlink algorithms.
CANTINA adopted heuristics in order to reduce FPR. TF-IDF is often used in
information retrieval and text mining (Salton & McGill, 1986). TF-IDF measures how
important a word is to a document in a corpus. TF means the number of times a given
term appears in a specific document. IDF represents a measure of the general importance
of the term. In other words, it shows how common a term is across an entire collection of
documents. If a term has a high TF-IDF weight, TF is high and DF is low.

The Robust Hyperlink algorithm was developed to address the problem of broken
hyperlinks (Phelps & Wilensky, 2000). Lexical signatures are a small number of well
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chosen terms to identify the given page. Lexical signatures are added to URLs and if the
link does not work, then it feeds signatures to search engine.

Figure 2.2 URL containing lexical signature

In CANTINA, TF-IDF was adopted to generate useful lexical signatures, and the
researchers found that top five words as scored by TF-IDF were surprisingly effective.
CANTINA is based on two assumptions that scammers often directly copy legitimate
webpages or include keywords like name of legitimate organizations, and with Google,
phishing webpages should have a low Google Page Rank considering few links pointing
to the fake webpages.

In the CANTINA process, first, it calculates the TF-IDF score for each word in a
given webpage. Second, it takes five words with highest TF-IDF weights. Third, it feeds
those five keywords to the Google search engine. If the domain name of current webpage
appears in the top N search results, the webpage is regarded as legitimate. The
researchers defined N = 30 since the number 30 was proved to work well. As a means of
reducing FPR, some heuristic methods were utilized in CANTINA. First method was to
add the domain name to the lexical signature since the domain name itself usually can
best identify the webpage. Second method was called ZMP. If Google returns zero search
results, the website is considered as phishing. Even though ZMP had the potential
problem to increase FPR, when combined with adding the domain name, it could actually

17
reduce FPR. For the last, CANTINA added several heuristics from SpoofGuard (Chou et
al., 2004), and PILFER (Fette et al., 2007) well known phishing detection tools. The
following table 2.1 lists the heuristics used in CANTINA. The similar or equal heuristics
to the listed heuristics except for the Forms and TF-IDF-Final were used in the
SpoofGuard and PILFER toolbars.

Table 2.1 Heuristics used in CANTINA
(source: adapted from Zhang, Hong, & Cranor, 2007)

When it comes to the limitations of CANTINA, first, querying Google each time
has such a bad impact on system performance. Second, the attackers can put images
instead of words in the forged webpage, and therefore the images can prevent the TF-IDF
algorithm from producing word scores. It is also plausible for scammers to use
indistinguishable color for text from the background color of the webpage. Once
criminals find out that CANTINA uses Google's PageRank algorithm, they can take
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advantage of already high page ranked webpages, or they can use the phishing URLs
after their phishing websites become indexed enough by Google.

2.4.3 PhishNet-NLP
PhishNet-NLP is a phishing detection algorithm based on email contents analysis
using natural language techniques (Verma, Shashidhar, & Hossain, 2012). PhishNet-NLP
is designed to distinguish between "actionable" and "informational" emails. The main
idea of PhishNet-NLP is that phishing emails are designed to trigger an action from users.
Therefore, the "actionable" email refers to the email leading users to do some actions in
email texts. The "informational" email represents the legitimate emails. The algorithm
consists of a combination of link analysis, header analysis, and text analysis, and it
determines if the email poses a phishing threat by a total score that is a sum of results of
three analyses.

The link analysis examines whether the websites led by the URLs in the email are
legitimate. If the body text in the email contains more than 10 distinct words, the system
selects the top four words out of the 10 words based on the words’ TF-IDF scores. Then,
the system feeds all domains from the URLs in the email to the Google search engine
along with the top four words, and if any domain does not appear in the top 30 results by
Google search, the email is regarded as phishing. The header analysis makes use of the
header contents of an email to decide if the email is a phishing email or not. This analysis
typically includes checking that the ‘FROM’, ‘DELIVERED-TO’, and ‘RECEIVED
FROM’ fields of the email matches the actual sender and checking the IP address from
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which the email was sent against phishing blacklists. The analyzing email text module is
based on natural language techniques including parsing, POS tagging, named entity
recognition, stemming, stopword removal and word sense disambiguation.

The text analysis portion takes into consideration “actionable verbs” that tempt
the user into performing an action. The text scoring module checks if email contains any
actionable verbs in body text and if any exists, then it scores the word called a keyword
with a scoring formula set by the authors. For the context score, the similarity
computation between the new email and the previous emails is performed. PhishNet-NLP
applied TF-IDF and cosine measure for similarity computation. The text score represents
whether email is innocuous or not itself and the context score represents whether email is
innocuous or not after comparing with the other emails including both user's sent and
received emails. The outcome of text analysis is the combination of the text score and the
context score. If the text score of the email shows that the email is not a phishing, then
the context score is calculated to determine if it is a legitimate email. Once those three
components finish their analyses, the scores are combined to make a decision. The
following figure 2.3 shows the overall workflow of PhishNet-NLP.
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Figure 2.3 Flow chart of PhishNet-NLP
(source: adapted from Verma, Shashidhar, & Hossain, 2012)

The algorithm produced promising results in their study. Header and link analysis
in their study consistently performed with an accuracy rating of over 95% in detecting
phishing emails in the experiments run. Text analysis lagged behind, performing between
about 60% and 80% accuracy. When it comes to FPR, header and link analysis produced
around 97% accuracy, but text analysis was only able to identify 79% (without the
context) and 85% (with context) as legitimate. The text analysis seems the main
component of this algorithm considering the implementation portion of the text analysis
in this research, but it is questioned to include the text analysis in the whole system since
the text analysis portion did not help the overall performance efficiency. It is believed
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that the accuracy rating of the text analysis can be improved upon by expanding the text
analysis algorithm. The remainder of this paper describes the efforts to the PhishNet-NLP
algorithm and presents the results with the expanded algorithm.
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CHAPTER 3. PROPOSED APPROACH

3.1

The Text Score in PhishNet-NLP

PhishNet-NLP used several techniques within the realm of text analysis to help
determine whether or not an email should be classified as phishing. Two scores are
generated by the PhishNet-NLP algorithm to help with this process, a text score and a
context score. In particular, this section will closely scrutinize the process of the text
score generation. In order to produce a text score, lexical analysis, POS tagging, named
entity recognition, normalization of words to lower case, stemming, and stopword
removal techniques are employed by the algorithm (Verma, Shashidhar, & Hossain,
2012).

For the named entity analysis, the set of all permutations of the email receiver's
first, last, and middle names and their spelling variants when taken two to N times where
N denoted the total number of names was calculated. According to the authors, an email
is likely to be a phishing attempt if an institution is mentioned within the email. Therefore,
an email was given a score of 1 to denote phishing if the number of named entities within
the email excluding those in the set of permutations was greater or equal to one.
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The analysis of actionable verbs utilizes WordNet to retrieve the synsets for each
of the initial actionable verbs. WordNet is known as an on-line lexical reference system.
WordNet can be also defined as a combination of thesaurus and dictionaries (Fellbaum,
2010). WordNet groups English nouns, verbs, and modifiers into synonym sets (synsets),
which are collections of similar words in terms of meanings (Miller et al.,1990).

The following formula shown in (1) was derived to calculate the text score of
actionable verbs found within each sentence in the email in question.

Text score (v) = {1 + x(l + a)} / 2L

(1)

Within this equation, v is the actionable verb, x equals 1 if the sentence contains a
word in SA (synset of adverbs) or a direction word. In case that the sentence has a link or
the word “url,” “link,” or “links”, x is also 1. Otherwise x equals 0. The parameter l is the
number of links contained in the email, and the maximum value of l is 2. The parameter a
equals 1 if there is a word conveying a sense of urgency or mention of money in the
sentence. The parameter L is the level of the actionable verb within the synset reached by
following the troponymy links from the synset of the initial actionable verbs. For instance,
if the actionable verb belongs to the set of synset following up to 1 troponymy links from
the synset of the initial actionable verbs, the L value is 2. SA, the set of direction words,
the set of urgency words and the actionable verbs are shown in the Appendix A. The text
score for the email is the maximum score of all the verbs within the email given from this
equation.

24
3.2

The Expansion of the Scope of POS for Actionable Verbs

The expansion in this study focused on the text score analysis. The modified
algorithm includes not only actionable verbs, but also other POS so that it can catch any
other actionable words in phishing emails, not just verbs. It is based on an intuition that a
command “Update your ……” can be as easily made with “your account information
needs to be updated” or “An update of your account” where, in this case, update is the
action in question. The word update above appeared with different POS forms: verb, past
participle and noun. By the same token, other actionable verbs such as click, go, and
move can be present in the body text in an email with a variety of POS forms. The
sentence where one of the actionable verbs exists in a different POS form still needs to be
examined by the text score analysis since the different POS forms do not change the level
of threat that the sentence potentially has. To prevent actionable words, not only verbs,
from not being caught, this proposed algorithm expanded the POS for the actionable
verbs into all POS.

3.3

Assumptions

The initial actionable verbs for use within these experiments were selected based
on the sample keywords supplied by the authors of PhishNet-NLP within their paper. The
authors did not explicitly state what keywords to use within PhishNet-NLP, and therefore
the sample keywords given in the paper were used. The list of actionable verbs can be
found in Appendix A.
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The stopwords within these experiments are the default English stopwords list
found at the following location: http://www.ranks.nl/resources/stopwords.html. This
word list was used for the stopwords in this research because information on the
stopwords used in the original PhishNet-NLP experiments was not provided. The list of
default English stopwords includes the following: Jr., Sr., Dr., Prof., Mr., Mrs., Ms.,
Miss., a, about, after, again, against, all, am, an, and, any, are, aren't, as, at, be, because,
been, being, both, if. This is not an exhaustive list of stopwords. The full list of stopwords
can be found in Appendix B.

Synonyms and troponyms of actionable words were chosen for the experiments
by the first sense of actionable words. For the purpose of finding the first sense of words,
WordNet was employed. Within the original PhishNet-NLP experiments, SenseLearner
(Mihalcea & Csomai, 2005) and TextRank (Mihalcea & Tarau, 2004) were used for word
sense disambiguation. These tools were unable to be implemented in this experiment
design due to difference in programming languages used. WordNet orders senses by the
estimated usage frequency of each sense of a word (Du et al., 2008). The most frequently
used sense of each word was therefore used to find synonyms and troponyms in this
analysis.

No context score was covered in these experiments, unlike the original PhishNetNLP. This is due to a lack of clarity in how the context score evaluation took place within
the original algorithm.
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Lastly, in the original PhishNet-NLP, the named entity recognition technique was
used to check that a phishing email has a recipient’s name. However, since the email
recipients’ names in corpus were not provided, these experiments did not make use of the
named entity recognition technique.

3.4

Implementation details and Data sets

For the implementation, Java programming language was used with the Eclipse
Kepler version as the development environment. The chosen stemming algorithm, which
is essential to extract the stem of the word, was the Porter stemmer in this research
(Porter, 1980). The Stanford POS tagger version 3.1.4 wsj-0-18-left3words was used for
POS tagging. The Stanford Tokenizer was used to divide text into a sequence of tokens.
WordNet was used to generate the synsets of the words used in analysis. WordNet 2.1
version was adopted to match as closely as possible the setup of the original PhishNetNLP experiments. When it comes to a simulation tool, AnyLogic 6.9.0 version university
education was used (XJ Technologies, 2013). The implementation was completed on the
Eclipse platform since the Eclipse supports better environment for Java in terms of
coding and debugging than AnyLogic does. Once the implementation on the Eclipse
platform was finished, it was ported to the AnyLogic model.

Two corpora were applied to the experiments for testing the modified algorithm.
The first corpus was the phishing corpus used in the original PhishNet-NLP experiments.
The total number of emails contained in this corpus is 4558, all of which are classified as
phishing emails (Nazario, 2004). The other corpus used for the experiments was the
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Enron email corpus (CALO Project, 2009). The chosen collection from the Enron corpus
for this implementation contains 7944 emails, all of which are classified as legitimate
emails. Both corpora are publicly available.
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1

The Simulation Procedure

The AnyLogic simulation model starts with the setting screen as seen in the figure
4.1. The setting has two input boxes for the phishing and the legitimate corpora. Since the
data for this study is limited to only two corpora, the default names of the input data are
PhishNET for the phishing corpus and Enron for the legitimate corpus. If any other
corpus is available in the future, the name of the corpus can be entered in the corpus input
box for processing. The radio button “The range of SV” is used to define the scope of the
synsets of the actionable words to be used in the experiment. The purpose of this option
is to measure the processing time and the phishing detection accuracy depending on the
selected range of the actionable words. Under the corpus input boxes and the range of SV
radio button, two check boxes exist. One of them is K-fold Cross-Validation. The k-fold
cross-validation technique is used to find some ineffective actionable words. The detail of
the k-fold cross-validation is described in section 4.3.1. For the k-fold cross-validation
test, it is required to choose the validation set and the training set. In this simulation, the
data set is divided into four groups, and only one group must be the validation set and the
rest of the groups are supposed to be the training set. The k-fold cross-validation test is
able to find unnecessary actionable words called bad keywords.
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The other check box, Exclude bad keywords, is used to run the simulation without
bad keywords. The user can input up to ten bad keywords.

Figure 4.1 The setting screen of the AnyLogic model.

Once the settings are finalized, clicking the Procedure Animation displayed on the
upper right directs to the procedure animation screen seen in the figures 4.2 and 4.3. The
simulation runs when the start button is pushed. On the upper side of the screen, the name
of email being examined is displayed. The simulation visualizes the process of the text
score generation, and thereby the decision is made whether the email is phishing or
legitimate. Both the original PhishNet-NLP algorithm and the modified algorithm
analyze the emails at the same time to compare both results. In the Finding a keyword
part, the found actionable word in the email is shown. The words shown in these two
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boxes are the stems of the words. The Calculation Processing part describes the specific
elements for the text score. Lastly, in the Decision part, both conclusions by two
algorithms are displayed with each of the maximum text score.

Figure 4.2 The procedure animation screen in the AnyLogic (1)

Figure 4.3 The procedure animation screen in the AnyLogic (2)
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Clicking the Results displayed in the upper right corner of the screen moves to the
results screen described in the figure 4.4 below. The total number of tested emails, the
number of emails containing no body texts, and the number of exceptions are presented.
The results of the phishing and legitimate corpus are separately produced by the original
PhishNet-NLP algorithm described as PhishNet and the modified algorithm described as
Expanding PhishNet in the results screen.

Figure 4.4 The results screen of the AnyLogic model.

Besides those results, the frequency of actionable words, POS, synsets of the
actionable words by troponymy levels is stored in an excel file. The AnyLogic supports
the function to store the data into an excel file or retrieve the data from an excel file. The
result of the k-fold cross-validation is saved in a text file.
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4.2

The Expansion of the Scope of POS for Actionable Verbs
4.2.1 Initial Results

4.2.1.1 The TPR in the Phishing Corpus
Testing on the phishing corpus yielded similar results for the original PhishNetNLP algorithm with context score removed that was achieved in the original experiments.
The figure 4.5 shows the results obtained in the original PhishNet-NLP. In the result of
the first run which excluded the context score, the text analysis had 68.6% phishing
detection rate.

Figure 4.5 The Results of Original PhishNet-NLP
(source: adapted from Verma, Shashidhar, & Hossain, 2012)

The original PhishNet-NLP algorithm in this simulation was able to correctly
identify 68.2% of phishing emails within the phishing corpus. The modified algorithm
showed about a 19% increase in identification over the PhishNet-NLP algorithm,
identifying 87% of phishing emails within the phishing corpus. These results are seen in
the figure 4.6 below.
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(a) PhishNet-NLP

(b) Expanding PhishNet-NLP

Figure 4.6 The initial TPR in the phishing corpus

4.2.1.2 The FPR in the Legitimate Corpus
Testing on the Enron corpus yielded slightly better results for the original
PhishNet-NLP algorithm over this extended algorithm. The original algorithm was able
to correctly label 92.6% of the emails in the Enron corpus as legitimate, and the expanded
algorithm obtained 87.5%. The new algorithm had about a 5% increase in FPR. The
results are described in the figure 4.7 below.
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(a) PhishNet-NLP

(b) Expanding PhishNet-NLP

Figure 4.7 The initial FPR in the legitimate corpus

4.2.2 Adjusted Results
As the experiments were run, some problems were founded both in the
implementation and the phishing corpus. First, a third party text tokenizer did not work
properly. Initially, LingPipe version 4.1.0 was adopted as the text tokenizer. LingPipe is a
well-known tool kit to process text based on computational linguistics (Baldwin &
Carpenter, 2003). The role of this tokenizer was to parse the body text in an email into
the sentences. However, LingPipe was not able to identify multiple spaces after a
sentence as a delimiter. The examples of this defect of LingPipe are described in the table
4.1 below.
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Table 4.1 The examples of the defect in tokenizing text by LingPipe
Example 1 – correctly split text into sentences

Original text

Parsed sentences by
LingPipe

PayPal is constantly working to ensure security by regularly screening the
accounts in our system. (Single space) We recently reviewed your
account, and we need more information to help us provide you with secure
service.
Sentence 1)
PayPal is constantly working to ensure security by regularly screening the
accounts in our system.
Sentence 2)
We recently reviewed your account, and we need more information to help
us provide you with secure service.

Example 2 – incorrectly split text into sentences

Original text

Parsed sentences by
LingPipe

Please click here and complete the Steps to Remove Limitations.
(Multiple spaces) Completing all of the checklist items will automatically
restore your account access.
Sentence 1)
Please click here and complete the Steps to Remove Limitations.
Completing all of the checklist items will automatically restore your
account access.

In the example 1, if there is a single space after a sentence followed by a period,
LingPipe can split the text into two separate sentences. However, if there are more than
two spaces after a period, this tokenizer misrecognizes the text as a single sentence that
the text actually consists of two separate sentences as seen in the example 2. This
problem affected the results. The falsely tokenzied sentence such as the example 2 could
have the text score that was calculated from more than two sentences respectively
containing an actionable word, and therefore it results in the high TPR and FPR. To
address this issue, the Stanford Tokenizer was adopted, and this tokenizer was able to
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correctly split the sentences regardless of the number of spaces between sentences
(Manning et al., 2013).

Second, the hyperlinks in emails confused splitting sentences. Most hyperlinks
have delimiters such as a question mark, semicolon and colon. Since the sentence
tokenizer could not distinguish between the delimiters in the sentences and the delimiters
in the hyperlinks, the tokenizer parsed a hyperlink containing the delimiters into the
separate hyperlinks.

Table 4.2 The example of the falsely tokenized sentences by hyperlink

Original text

Parsed sentences

However, if you did not initiate the log ins, please visit PayPal as soon as
possible to verify your identity : https:\/\/www.paypal.com\/us\/cgibin\/webscr ? cmd = _ login-run Verify your identity is a security
measure that will ensure that you are the only person with access to the
account .
Sentence 1)
However, if you did not initiate the log ins, please visit PayPal as soon as
possible to verify your identity : https:\/\/www.paypal.com\/us\/cgibin\/webscr ?
Sentence 2)
cmd = _ login-run Verify your identity is a security measure that will
ensure that you are the only person with access to the account .

As seen in the example in the table 4.2 above, the tokenizer split the sentence by
the question mark in the hyperlink. In addition, the second sentence, “Verity…”, was
regarded as the same sentence with the first sentence due to the lack of an end delimiter
after the hyperlink. Whether a sentence has a hyperlink or not directly affects the x value
in the text score equation. In that example, the x value by the hyperlink is counted twice
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since the hyperlink is split into the two sentences. To fix this problem, a hyperlink was
replaced with the unique word, ‘GIL_Symbol_of_Hyperlink’. If the first word after the
hyperlink starts with a capital letter with which a new sentence begins, the unique word is
followed by a period.

Lastly, the phishing corpus contained some malformed emails. Each email is
supposed to have its unique email id called message id, and this implementation counts
emails by the messaged ids. In the phishing corpus, some redundant message ids
appeared without any information. Since they were considered as emails without texts, it
increased the TPR. To fix this falsely increased the TPR, the redundant message ids were
removed. Some emails had unreadable character sets by the program such as iso18899997-1, iso-6078-6, iso-5367-8, iso-3290-7. These characters sets were converted
into process able character sets. Emails grammatically malformed were fixed. The
examples of errors are shown in the table 4.3 below.

Table 4.3 The example of the errors found in the phishing corpus.
Example 1 – incorrect character set
Before

After

Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
boundary="=_NextPart_2rfkindysadvnqw3nerasdf";iso-8859-1

Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
boundary="=_NextPart_2rfkindysadvnqw3nerasdf";charset="iso-8859-1";

Table 4.3 Continued.
Example 2 – missing boundary
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X-UID: 83

Before
<BODY><TABLE><TR><TD bgcolor="#ffffff">
X-UID: 83

After

----66396224937412452773
<BODY><TABLE><TR><TD bgcolor="#ffffff">

4.2.2.1 The TPR in the Phishing Corpus
Testing on the error fixed phishing corpus with the modified implementation
yielded slightly lower the TPR results for both the PhishNet-NLP and the expanded
algorithm than the previous initial TPR results. The PhishNet-NLP algorithm was able to
correctly identify 65.6% of phishing emails within the phishing corpus. The expanded
algorithm showed about an 18% increase in identification over the PhishNet-NLP
algorithm, identifying 83.5% of phishing emails within the phishing corpus. The results
are seen in the figure 4.8 below.

(a) PhishNet-NLP

(b) Expanding PhishNet-NLP

Figure 4.8 The adjusted TPR in the phishing corpus
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4.2.2.2 The FPR in the Legitimate Corpus
Testing on the Enron corpus with the modified implementation produced slightly
higher FPR results for both the PhishNet-NLP and the expanded algorithm than the
previous initial FPR results. The original algorithm was able to correctly label 91.2% of
the emails in the Enron corpus as legitimate. The expanded algorithm was able to
correctly label 85.1% of the emails as legitimate. The new algorithm had about a 6%
increase in FPR for the legitimate corpus. The results are present in the figure 4.9 below.

(a) PhishNet-NLP

(b) Expanding PhishNet-NLP

Figure 4.9 The adjusted FPR in the legitimate corpus

4.2.3 Inferences of the widened gap in the results
The table 4.4 below describes the results from the PhishNet-NLP and the
modified algorithm. The original TPR in the initial results was very close to the TPR of
the PhishNet-NLP. In the adjusted results not only the gap in the TPR from the PhishNetNLP became widened, but also the overall phishing detection performance was somewhat
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lowered as compared to the initial results. The initial implementation could seem to be
the better solution than the next one only based on the results. However, given that the
difference in the results between the PhishNet-NLP and the initial run of the modified
algorithm are only 0.4%, it can be inferred that the PhishNet-NLP could have tested the
phishing corpus without modifying the exceptions, or could have had the similar text
parsing problems like the issues mentioned in the previous section 4.2.2.

Table 4.4 The Comparison of TPR results
PhishNet -NLP

Modif ied algorit hm
Init ial result s

Adjust ed result s

Original

Original

Expanded

Original

Expanded

TP

68.6%

68.2%

87%

65.6%

83.5%

Total Emails

4550

4564 (4506 w/ o exceptions)

4558

No Text Emails

unknown

144

148

Exception Emails

unknown

58

0

For the FPR, the adjusted results showed the increase in the FPR compared to the
initial results. The results are seen in the table 4.5 below. Main reason of this increase is
that the initial implementation had an issue when it parsed sentences into words. When
the sentences were split into the words, some words still had some punctuation marks
such as ‘account,’. ‘("confidential")’, ‘union.’, and therefore these kinds of words could
not be processed by the initial algorithm.
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Table 4.5 The Comparison of FPR results
Modif ied algorit hm
Init ial result s

TP

Adjust ed result s

Original

Expanded

Original

Expanded

7.43%

12.54%

8.76%

14.89%

Total Emails

7944

7944

No Text Emails

3

3

Exception Emails

0

0

4.2.4 Increase in both TPR and FPR
This proposed approach obtained significantly better results in identifying
phishing emails than the previous work. However, the rate of falsely recognizing emails
as phishing became somewhat worse. This section explains the reasons for both increase
in TPR and FPR based on the outcomes. First reason that contributes to improvement in
phishing detection was that actionable keywords were found not only as verb forms, but
also other POS forms. In the results shown in the following figures 4.10 and 4.11, the
new expanded algorithm found 40% actionable keywords of all keywords that it founded
from NN (noun), VBG (gerund) and VBN (past participle). The Stanford POS
abbreviations can be found in Appendix C. The sum of those forms is larger than the
portion of VB (verb). Even assuming that all forms of the verb were accounted for (VBN,
VBG, etc), the sum of their tags with VB still only accounts for 70% of the data
contributing to classification. This result shows that in many cases actionable keywords
can exist in different POS forms, and it means that it must consider other POS when an
actionable keyword is added.
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90%

PhishNet-NLP

79.25%

80%

(Phishing Corpus)

70%

VB

60%

VBP

50%

VBZ

40%

VBD

30%
15.24%

20%
10%
0%

VB

VBP

3.85%

1.67%

VBZ

VBD

Figure 4.10 Phishing Corpus POS rankings in PhishNet-NLP

40%

Expanding PhishNet-NLP

37.8%

(Phishing Corpus)

35%

VB
NN
VBG
VBP
VBN
NNP
JJ
VBZ
NNS
FW
VBD

30%
25%
20%

18.0%
15.3%

15%
10%

7.3% 6.6%

5%

5.3% 4.4%
1.8% 1.5% 1.1%
0.8% 0.0%

0%
VB

NN

VBG

VBP

VBN NNP

JJ

VBZ

NNS

FW

VBD NNPS

Figure 4.11 Phishing Corpus POS rankings in Expanding PhishNet-NLP

It is likely that Stanford parser's errors contribute to the better results when all
POS are used. Stanford parser frequently tags a verb as NN or NNP in case that a
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sentence is an imperative sentence. For example, in the sentence, "Click here to verify
your account if you choose to ignore our request", the verb "Click" is tagged as NNP, and
in the sentence, "Please visit PayPal as soon as possible to verify your identity", the verb
visit is tagged as NN (noun). The expanded algorithm covers all POS, and that lead to
significant improvement in phishing detection.

When it comes to the higher FPR, since the new algorithm considers all POS, it
catches and calculates more actionable keywords than the original algorithm does. That
means the expanded algorithm could mistake legitimate emails for phishing emails. In the
result of the expanded algorithm shown in the figure 4.12 and 4.13 below, VBG (gerund),
NNP (singular pronoun) and NN (noun) had considerably impact on the increase in FPR.
The portion of gerund, noun and pronoun is 44% of all actionable keywords that lead to
the FPR. Even though those POS forms improve to detect phishing emails, at the same
time they play a key role in increasing the FPR.

PhishNet-NLP

90%
80%

76.32%

(Legitimate Corpus)

70%

VB

60%

VBP

50%

VBZ

40%

VBD

30%
17.21%

20%

4.86%

10%

1.62%

0%
VB

VBP

VBZ

VBD

Figure 4.12 Legitimate Corpus POS rankings in PhishNet-NLP
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40%
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30%
25%
20%
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15%
10.3%
10%

7.7%
3.7% 3.7% 3.0%
2.2%

5%
0%

VB
VBG
NNP
NN
VBP
NNS
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VBD
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VB

VBG

NNP

NN

VBP

NNS

VBN

JJ

VBZ

0.7% 0.4% 0.1%
VBD NNPS

RB

Figure 4.13 Legitimate Corpus POS rankings in Expanding PhishNet-NLP

The proposed algorithm resulted in the increase in FPR. 6% increase may not be
substantial, but incorrectly flagging an important legitimate email as phishing could have
large costs on users. This problem should be addressed.

4.3

Tuning out FPR

The proposed algorithm resulted in the 6% higher FPR than the FPR in the
original algorithm. To address this increased FPR problem, the suggested solution was to
tradeoff between TPR and FPR maximizing the decrease in FPR with minimizing the
sacrifice of the accuracy of catching phishing emails. The rationale for this approach was
that the frequency of each actionable word found in the phishing corpus and the
legitimate corpus was different. The results are seen in the figure 4.14 and 4.15, and the
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percentage represents the number of text scores that is more than 1 by the actionable
word. For instance, the most frequent actionable word in the legitimate corpus is the word
subject, and its percentage is over 25%. On the other hand, the percentage of the word
subject in the phishing corpus is only 0.9%. If some actionable words increase FPR, but
not TPR, more promising results can be expected by excluding those actionable words.
25%

Expanding PhishNet-NLP

20.3%

20%

(Phishing Corpus)

17.0%

15%

13.1%
12.1%
9.3%

10%

5.3%

5%

3.7%

2.7%

1.7% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.3% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 0.9%

0.8% 0.7%

0%

Figure 4.14 Percentage of each actionable word in the phishing corpus.
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25.1%

25%
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20%
15%
10%
5%

14.8%

14.1%
7.8%

6.7%

5.4% 4.7%

4.0% 3.9%

2.5% 1.6%

1.5% 1.3% 1.2% 0.8%

0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5%

0%

Figure 4.15 Percentage of each actionable word in the legitimate corpus.
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4.3.1 K-Fold Cross-Validation
To find the optimum trade-off to reduce the FPR, how much each actionable word
affects TPR and FPR was measured. At first, it was considered to run the experiment on
all data sets without the actionable word to identify the word’s effect on the TPR and
FPR, and the test would be repeated until all actionable words were examined. However,
this approach encountered a risk of overfitting problem. When the size of the training
sample is not large enough to generate a representative sample of the true target function,
it is said that the algorithm overfits the training samples – in other words, if the algorithm
derived from the training examples actually does not perform quite well over the
instances except the training set, there is the overfitting problem in the algorithm
(Mitchell, 1997).

One of several techniques available to address the overfitting problem is a k-fold
cross-validation approach. Cross-Validation is a way to statistically evaluate and compare
learning algorithms using two data sets which consists of one training set to learn or train
a model and one validation set to validate the model (Refaeilzadeh et al., 2009). The
training and validation sets cross over in order for each data point to be validated. The kfold cross-validation is the general form of cross-validation. In k-fold cross-validation,
the data is divided into k equal sized sets, and cross-validation of training and validation
are performed k different times. Every time, a different partition of training and
validation sets is used. For instance, when the first set is to be validated, the rest of k – 1
sets are the training set for learning. Cross-validation is useful when extra data can
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provide a validation set; however, in case that only limited data is available, the k-fold
cross-validation approach is effective (Mitchell, 1997).

This study adopted a k-fold cross-validation since the size of the data was small
and extra data was not available. To conduct a k-fold cross-validation, the data set, the
phishing and legitimate corpora, was partitioned into four groups. The following table 4.6
describes the number of emails in each partition. The data was randomly divided into the
four sets.
Table 4.6 The number of Emails in the Partitioned sets.
Partition

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

Group 4

Phishing

1139

1140

1139

1140

Legitimate

1986

1986

1986

1986

Total

3125

3126

3125

3126

# Emails

4.3.1.1 Group 1 as the Validation set
In this scenario, the first group was set as the validation set, and the rest of the
groups were automatically set as the training set. The TPR and FPR of the training set
were measured using all actionable words. Those rates were used to compare with the
TPR and FPR of the training set using all except the actionable word that was tested to
see its effect on the TPR and FPR. The increase in the TPR and FPR by each actionable
word in the training set is seen in the figure 4.16 below. The word support, click, and use
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had the most influence on the TPR; on the other hand, the word subject had a huge
impact on the FPR without any effect on the TPR.
6.0%

5.0%

Group 1 (Validation set)
Group 2 & 3 & 4(Training set)
TP

4.0%

FP
3.0%

2.0%

1.0%

0.0%

Figure 4.16 Increase in TPR and FPR by each actionable word with the Group 2, 3, and 4.

To decide whether to exclude the actionable word, the statistical significance test
was adopted. Total three different statistical significance tests were conducted to the
actionable words. The first significance test was to determine whether the increase in the
FPR by the actionable word was statistically significant. The null and alternative
hypotheses are as stated below (2).

H0: p1 = p2

(2)

Ha: p1 ≠ p2,
where p1 = proportion of FP using all actionable words,
p2 = proportion of FP using all except the actionable word under test.
(proportions in the training set)
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This hypothesis was evaluated using McNemar’s Test which is a well-known
analysis for proportions from paired data (McNemar, 1947). For the McNemar’s Test, the
MedCalc statistical software version 12.7.5.0 was used (MedCalc, 2013).

The significance test for the increase in the TPR by the actionable word was also
conducted by using the same methods as the FPR. The null and alternative hypotheses are
as stated below (3).
H0: p1 = p2

(3)

Ha: p1 ≠ p2,
where p1 = proportion of TP using all actionable words,
p2 = proportion of TP using all except the actionable word under test.
(proportions in the training set)

If the results of two hypotheses testing conclude that the effect of the actionable
word on both TPR and FPR is statistically significant, then the proportion of the increase
in TPR and the proportion of the increase in FPR are compared by using the two
proportions hypothesis testing. Since the data of TPR was different from the data of FPR,
unlike the previous two tests, this test used the two proportions hypothesis testing. The
null and alternative hypotheses are as stated below (4).

H0: p1 = p2

(4)

Ha: p1 > p2,
where p1 = proportion of the increase in FP by the actionable word,
p2 = proportion of the increase in TP by the actionable word.
(proportions in the training set)
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The following table 4.7 lists the results of all actionable words’ hypothesis tests.
In the table, the label “No Change” on the third column means that the actionable word
does not affect the TPR, and the label “Unnecessary” on the firth column means that the
hypothesis test is not needed because either of the previous tests was not statistically
significant. In the last column, the final decision whether to exclude the actionable word
from the list of actionable words or not was made based on the results of the significance
test. The significance level was set at 0.05.

Table 4.7 Significance test results of the actionable words with the Group 2, 3, and 4.
Significance Test (P-value) (significance level: α = 0.05)
H0: p1 = p2
Ha: p1 > p2

H0: p1 = p2
Ha: p1 ≠ p2

H0: p1 = p2
Ha: p1 ≠ p2

(p1: FPR with all words)
(p2: FPR w/o the word)

(p1: TPR with all words)
(p2: TPR w/o the word)

(p1: FPR increase by the
word)
(p2: TPR increase by the
word)

support

P = 0.0156

P < 0.0001

P > 0.9999

Include

click

P < 0.0001

P < 0.0001

P > 0.9999

Include

use

P < 0.0001

P < 0.0001

P > 0.9999

Include

update

P = 0.0313

P < 0.0001

P > 0.9999

Include

confirm

P = 0.0078

P < 0.0001

P > 0.9999

Include

follow

P < 0.0001

P < 0.0001

P > 0.9999

Include

visit

P = 0.1250

P < 0.0001

Unnecessary

Include

submit

P = 0.2500

P = 0.0156

Unnecessary

Include

see

P < 0.0001

P < 0.0001

P = 0.6554

Include

employ

P = 1.0000

P = 0.5000

Unnecessary

Include

cancel

P = 1.0000

P = 0.5000

Unnecessary

Include

challenge

P = 1.0000

No Change

Unnecessary

Include

snap

P = 0.2500

P = 1.0000

Unnecessary

Include

apply

P = 0.0625

P = 1.0000

Unnecessary

Include

Word

Table 4.7 Continued.

Conclusion
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go

P < 0.0001

P < 0.0001

P = 0.6844

Include

sustain

P = 0.0313

No Change

Unnecessary

Exclude

move

P < 0.0001

P = 0.0625

P = 0.0119

Exclude

utilize

P < 0.0001

No Change

Unnecessary

Exclude

subject

P < 0.0001

No Change

Unnecessary

Exclude

It was decided to exclude four actionable words: sustain, move, utilize, and
subject, for the effect on the FPR by each of the four words was statistically significant,
and the effect on the TPR by the four words was either none or not statistically significant.
Here, those actionable words increasing the FPR, but not the TPR were called bad
keywords. The TPR and FPR with the training set were re-measured except for the four
bad keywords, and the results were compared with the results obtained using all
actionable words. The comparison on the results is seen in the figure 4.17.

Group 2 & 3 & 4 (Training set)
TP & FP results
90%

83.94%

83.80%

80%
ALL_keywords

70%

Except_BadKeywords

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%

14.92%
9.62%

10%
0%
TP

FP

Figure 4.17 The comparison on TPR and FPR in the Group 2, 3, and 4.
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The test without the bad keywords resulted in 5.3% decrease in the FPR, and 0.14%
decrease in the TPR. The hypothesis test was conducted to the decrease in the TPR and
the FPR to see whether the difference was statistically significant. The null and
alternative hypotheses are as stated below (5) for the TPR, and (6) for the FPR.

H0: p1 = p2

(5)

Ha: p1 ≠ p2,
where p1 = proportion of TP using all actionable words,
p2 = proportion of TP using all except the bad keywords.
(proportions in the training set)

H0: p1 = p2

(6)

Ha: p1 ≠ p2,
where p1 = proportion of FP using all actionable words,
p2 = proportion of FP using all except the bad keywords.
(proportions in the training set)

The p-value of the hypothesis test (5) was 0.0625 which could not reject the null
hypothesis. In other words, the data did not provide enough evidence that the decrease in
the TPR was statistically significant. The p-value of the hypothesis test (6) was less than
0.0001, and thereby the null hypothesis became rejected. The conclusion is that the data
provided that the decrease in the FPR was statistically significant.

For the next step, the TPR and FPR with the validation set were re-measured in
the same way as the training set and the comparison of results is seen in the figure 4.18.
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90%

Group1 (Validation set)
TP & FP results
82.27%

82.18%

80%

ALL_keywords

70%

Except_BadKeywords

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%

14.80%

11.83%

10%
0%
TP

FP

Figure 4.18 The comparison on TPR and FPR in the Group 1.

The test resulted in 2.97% decrease in the FPR, and 0.09% decrease in the TPR.
The null and alternative hypotheses are as stated below (7) for the TPR, and (8) for the
FPR.
H0: p1 = p2

(7)

Ha: p1 ≠ p2,
where p1 = proportion of TP using all actionable words,
p2 = proportion of TP using all except the bad keywords.
(proportions in the validation set)

H0: p1 = p2

(8)

Ha: p1 ≠ p2,
where p1 = proportion of FP using all actionable words,
p2 = proportion of FP using all except the bad keywords.
(proportions in the validation set)
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The p-value of the hypothesis test (7) was 1.000 which could not reject the null
hypothesis. In other words, the data did not provide enough evidence that the decrease in
the TPR was statistically significant. The p-value of the hypothesis test (8) was less than
0.0001, and thereby the null hypothesis could be rejected. Therefore, the data provided
that the decrease in the FPR was statistically significant.

To check if the differences in the decrease in TPR and FPR between the training
set and the validation set is statistically significant, the following hypothesis tests, (9) for
TPR, (10) for FPR were performed.

H0: p1 = p2

(9)

Ha: p1 ≠ p2,
where p1 = proportion of the decrease in TP in the training set by excluding the bad keywords,
p2 = proportion of the decrease in TP in the validation set by excluding the bad keywords.

H 0 : p 1 = p2

(10)

Ha: p1 ≠ p2,
where p1 = proportion of the decrease in FP in the training set by excluding the bad keywords,
p2 = proportion of the decrease in FP in the validation set by excluding the bad keywords.

The p-value of the hypothesis test (9) was 0.63836, and thereby the null
hypothesis could not be rejected. The p-value of the hypothesis test (10) was 0, and
thereby the null hypothesis could be rejected. In other words, the data could not provide
enough evidence that the differences in the decrease in TPR between the training set and
the validation set was statistically significant. However, the data provided enough
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evidence that the differences in the decrease in FPR between the training set and the
validation set was statistically significant.

4.3.1.2 Group 2 as the Validation set
This time, the second group was set as the validation set, and the rest of the
groups were set as the training set. The increase in the TPR and FPR by each actionable
word in the training set is seen in the figure 4.19 below. The word support had the most
influence on the TPR followed by the word click and use, and the word subject still had
the most significant impact on the FPR.
6.0%
5.0%

Group 2 (Validation set)
Group 1 & 3 & 4 (Training set)
TP

4.0%

FP
3.0%
2.0%
1.0%
0.0%

Figure 4.19 Increase in TPR and FPR by the actionable words with the Group 1, 3, and 4.

The following table 4.8 lists the results of all actionable words’ hypothesis test.
According to the results of the significance tests, five bad keywords were found: sustain,
apply, move, utilize, and subject. The TPR and FPR with the training set were re-

56
measured except for the five bad keywords, and the comparison with the results obtained
using all actionable words was performed, which is described in the figure 4.20.

Table 4.8 Significance test results of the actionable words with the Group 1, 3, and 4.
Significance Test (P-value) (α = 0.05)
H0: p1 = p2
Ha: p1 > p2

H0: p1 = p2
Ha: p1 ≠ p2

H0: p1 = p2
Ha: p1 ≠ p2

(p1: FPR with all words)
(p2: FPR w/o the word)

(p1: TPR with all words)
(p2: TPR w/o the word)

(p1: FPR increase by the
word)
(p2: TPR increase by the
word)

support

P = 0.1250

P < 0.0001

Unnecessary

Include

use

P < 0.0001

P < 0.0001

P > 0.9999

Include

click

P < 0.0001

P < 0.0001

P > 0.9999

Include

update

P = 0.0020

P < 0.0001

P > 0.9999

Include

follow

P < 0.0001

P < 0.0001

P > 0.9999

Include

confirm

P = 0.0156

P < 0.0001

P > 0.9999

Include

visit

P = 0.0313

P < 0.0001

P > 0.9999

Include

submit

P = 0.5000

P = 0.0002

Unnecessary

Include

see

P < 0.0001

P < 0.0001

P = 0.9641

Include

employ

P = 1.0000

P = 0.1250

Unnecessary

Include

go

P < 0.0001

P < 0.0001

P = 0.6664

Include

travel

P = 1.0000

P = 0.5000

Unnecessary

Include

snap

P = 0.5000

P = 1.0000

Unnecessary

Include

cancel

P = 0.1250

P = 1.0000

Unnecessary

Include

challenge

P = 0.2500

No Change

Unnecessary

Include

sustain

P = 0.0313

No Change

Unnecessary

Exclude

apply

P = 0.0039

No Change

Unnecessary

Exclude

move

P < 0.0001

P = 0.0313

P = 0.0301

Exclude

utilize

P < 0.0001

No Change

Unnecessary

Exclude

subject

P < 0.0001

No Change

Unnecessary

Exclude

Word

Conclusion
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Group 1 & 3 & 4 (Training set)
TP & FP results
90%
81.54% 81.36%
80%

ALL_keywords

70%

Except_BadKeywords

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%

15.22%
10.46%

10%
0%
TP

FP

Figure 4.20 The comparison on TPR and FPR in the Group 1, 3, and 4.

Excluding the bad keywords resulted in 4.76% decrease in the FPR, and 0.18%
decrease in the TPR. For the TPR, the hypothesis test (5) was conducted, and the p-value
was 0.0313 which rejected the null hypothesis. For the FPR, the p-value of the hypothesis
test (6) was less than 0.0001, and thereby the null hypothesis could be rejected. Since the
two tests rejected the null hypothesis, the data provided enough evidence that the both
decreases in the TPR and the FPR were statistically significant. The same process applied
to the validation set and the comparison of results is seen in the figure 4.21.
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Group 2 (Validation set)
TP & FP results
100%
90%

89.47%

89.39%
ALL_keywords

80%

Except_BadKeywords

70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%

13.90%

8.71%

10%
0%
TP

FP

Figure 4.21 The comparison on TPR and FPR in the Group 2.

The test produced about 5% decrease in the FPR, and only 0.08% decrease in the
TPR. The p-value of the hypothesis test (7) was 1.000 which could not reject the null
hypothesis. In other words, the data did not provide enough evidence that the decrease in
the TPR was statistically significant. The p-value of the hypothesis test (8) was less than
0.0001, and thereby the null hypothesis could be rejected. Therefore, the data provided
that the decrease in the FPR was statistically significant.

When it comes to the significance tests for the differences in the decrease in TPR
and FPR between the training set and the validation set, the p-value of the hypothesis test
(9) was 0.5157, and thereby the null hypothesis could not be rejected. The p-value of the
hypothesis test (10) was 0, and thereby the null hypothesis could be rejected. In other
words, the data did not provide enough evidence that the difference in the decrease in
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TPR between the training set and the validation set was statistically significant. However,
the data provided enough evidence that the difference in the FPR decrease between the
training set and the validation set was statistically significant.

4.3.1.3 Group 3 as the Validation set
The third group was set as the validation set, and the group 1, 2, and 4 were set as
the training set. The increase in the TPR and FPR by each actionable word in the training
set is shown in the figure 4.22 below. The word support, click had the most influence on
the TPR. When it comes to the FPR, the word subject still had the most significant impact.

4.5%
4.0%
3.5%
3.0%

Group 3 (Validation set)
Group 1 & 2& 4 (Training set)

TP
FP

2.5%
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%

Figure 4.22 Increase in TPR and FPR by the actionable words with the Group 1, 2, and 4.

The results of all actionable words’ hypothesis tests are seen in the following
table 4.9. The same words as the previous section 4.3.1.3: sustain, apply, move, utilize,
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and subject were considered as bad keywords. The TPR and FPR with the training set
were re-measured except for the five bad keywords, and the comparison with the results
obtained using all actionable words was performed, which is described in the figure 4.23.

Table 4.9 Significance test results of the actionable words with the Group 1, 2, and 4.
Significance Test (P-value) (α = 0.05)
H0: p1 = p2
Ha: p1 > p2

H0: p1 = p2
Ha: p1 ≠ p2

H0: p1 = p2
Ha: p1 ≠ p2

(p1: FPR with all words)
(p2: FPR w/o the word)

(p1: TPR with all words)
(p2: TPR w/o the word)

(p1: FPR increase by the
word)
(p2: TPR increase by the
word)

support

P = 0.0313

P < 0.0001

P > 0.9999

Include

use

P < 0.0001

P < 0.0001

P > 0.9999

Include

click

P < 0.0001

P < 0.0001

P > 0.9999

Include

update

P = 0.0625

P < 0.0001

Unnecessary

Include

confirm

P = 0.0039

P < 0.0001

P > 0.9999

Include

follow

P < 0.0001

P < 0.0001

P = 0.9909

Include

see

P < 0.0001

P < 0.0001

P = 0.9826

Include

visit

P = 0.5000

P = 0.0078

Unnecessary

Include

submit

P = 0.2500

P = 0.0313

Unnecessary

Include

employ

P = 1.0000

P = 0.1250

Unnecessary

Include

travel

P = 1.0000

P = 0.5000

Unnecessary

Include

challenge

P = 0.5000

No Change

Unnecessary

Include

snap

P = 1.0000

P = 1.0000

Unnecessary

Include

cancel

P = 0.1250

P = 0.5000

Unnecessary

Include

go

P < 0.0001

P < 0.0001

P = 0.7224

Include

sustain

P = 0.0078

No Change

Unnecessary

Exclude

apply

P = 0.0005

P = 1.0000

Unnecessary

Exclude

move

P < 0.0001

P = 0.0625

Unnecessary

Exclude

utilize

P < 0.0001

No Change

Unnecessary

Exclude

subject

P < 0.0001

No Change

Unnecessary

Exclude

Word

Conclusion
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Group 1 & 2 & 4 (Training set)
TP & FP results
90%

85.00%

84.82%

80%
ALL_keywords

70%

Except_BadKeywords

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%

13.86%
9.35%

10%
0%
TP

FP

Figure 4.23 The comparison on TPR and FPR in the Group 1, 2, and 4.

The test without the five bad keywords decreased 4.51% in the FPR, and 0.18% in
the TPR. For the decrease in the TPR, the hypothesis test (5) was conducted and the pvalue was 0.0313, and thereby the null hypothesis became rejected. For the FPR, the
hypothesis test (6) was used and the p-value of was less than 0.0001, and thereby the null
hypothesis became rejected. Since the two tests rejected the null hypothesis, the data
provided enough evidence that the both decreases in the TPR and the FPR were
statistically significant. The same process applied to the validation set and the
comparison of results is seen in the figure 4.24.
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Group 3 (Validation set)
TP & FP results

90%
80%

79.10%

79.02%

70%

ALL_keywords

60%

Except_BadKeywords

50%
40%
30%
17.98%

20%

12.03%

10%
0%
TP

FP

Figure 4.24 The comparison on TPR and FPR in the Group 3.

The test produced 5.95% decrease in the FPR, and only 0.08% decrease in the
TPR. For the decrease in the TPR, the p-value of the hypothesis test (7) was 1.000 which
could not reject the null hypothesis. In other words, the data did not provide enough
evidence that the decrease in the TPR was statistically significant. For the decrease in the
FPR, the p-value of the hypothesis test (8) was less than 0.0001, and thereby the null
hypothesis could be rejected. Therefore, the data provided that the decrease in the FPR
was statistically significant.

For the significance tests for the differences in the decrease in TPR and FPR
between the training set and the validation set, the p-value of the hypothesis test (9) was
1.000, and thereby the null hypothesis could not be rejected. The p-value of the
hypothesis test (10) was 0.01046, and thereby the null hypothesis could be rejected. In
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other words, the data could not provide enough evidence that the difference in the
decrease in TPR between the training set and the validation set was statistically
significant. However, the data provided enough evidence that the difference in the
decrease in FPR between the training set and the validation set was statistically
significant.

4.3.1.4 Group 4 as the Validation set
Lastly, the forth group was set as the validation set, and the group 1, 2, and 3 were
set as the training set. The increase in the TPR and FPR by each actionable word in the
training set is shown in the figure 4.25 below. The word click was the most outstanding
word for the TPR, and the word subject still had the most significant impact on the FPR.
5.0%
4.5%
4.0%
3.5%

Group 4 (Validation set)
Group 1 & 2 & 3 (Training set)

TP
FP

3.0%
2.5%
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%

Figure 4.25 Increase in TPR and FPR by the actionable words with the Group 1, 2, and 3.
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The results of all actionable words’ hypothesis tests are seen in the following
table 4.10. The significance tests found six bad keywords: apply, see, utilize, move, go,
and subject. The TPR and FPR with the training set were re-measured except for the six
bad keywords, and the comparison with the original result was performed. The results are
described in the figure 4.26.

Table 4.10 Significance test results of the actionable words with the Group 1, 2, and 3.
Significance Test (P-value) (α = 0.05)
H0: p1 = p2
Ha: p1 > p2

H0: p1 = p2
Ha: p1 ≠ p2

H0: p1 = p2
Ha: p1 ≠ p2

(p1: FPR with all words)
(p2: FPR w/o the word)

(p1: TPR with all words)
(p2: TPR w/o the word)

(p1: FPR increase by the
word)
(p2: TPR increase by the
word)

use

P < 0.0001

P < 0.0001

P > 0.9999

Include

click

P < 0.0001

P < 0.0001

P > 0.9999

Include

support

P = 0.1250

P < 0.0001

Unnecessary

Include

update

P = 0.0039

P < 0.0001

P > 0.9999

Include

visit

P = 0.0313

P < 0.0001

P > 0.9999

Include

confirm

P = 0.0039

P < 0.0001

P > 0.9999

Include

follow

P < 0.0001

P < 0.0001

P > 0.9995

Include

submit

P = 1.0000

P = 0.0002

Unnecessary

Include

travel

P = 1.0000

P = 0.5000

Unnecessary

Include

cancel

P = 0.2500

P = 1.0000

Unnecessary

Include

snap

P = 0.2500

No Change

Unnecessary

Include

challenge

P = 0.2500

No Change

Unnecessary

Include

sustain

P = 0.1250

No Change

Unnecessary

Include

apply

P = 0.0020

P = 1.0000

P = 0.0294

Exclude

see

P < 0.0001

P = 0.0010

P = 0.0384

Exclude

utilize

P < 0.0001

No Change

Unnecessary

Exclude

move

P < 0.0001

P = 0.5000

Unnecessary

Exclude

go

P < 0.0001

P = 0.0001

P = 0.0002

Exclude

subject

P < 0.0001

No Change

Unnecessary

Exclude

Word

Conclusion
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Group 1 & 2 & 3 (Training set)
TP & FP results
90%

83.62%

82.50%

80%

ALL_keywords

70%

Except_BadKeywords

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%

15.56%
8.09%

10%
0%
TP

FP

Figure 4.26 The comparison on TPR and FPR in the Group 1, 2, and 3.

The test without the five bad keywords decreased 7.47% in the FPR, and 1.12% in
the TPR. For the decrease in the TPR, the hypothesis test (5) was conducted and the pvalue was less than 0.0001, and thereby the null hypothesis became rejected. For the
decrease in the FPR, the hypothesis test (6) was conducted and the p-value of was less
than 0.0001, and thereby the null hypothesis became rejected. Since the two tests rejected
the null hypothesis, the data provided enough evidence that the both decreases in the TPR
and the FPR were statistically significant. The same process applied to the validation set
and the comparison of results is seen in the figure 4.27.
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Group 4 (Validation set)
TP & FP results
90%

83.25%
77.63%

80%

ALL_keywords

70%

Except_BadKeywords

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%

12.89%
5.44%

10%
0%
TP

FP

Figure 4.27 The comparison on TPR and FPR in the Group 4.

The test produced 5.62% decrease in the FPR, and 7.45% decrease in the TPR.
For the decrease in the TPR, the p-value of the hypothesis test (7) was less than 0.0001,
and thereby the null hypothesis could be rejected. For the decrease in the FPR, the
hypothesis (8) was conducted, and the p-value of was less than 0.0001, and thereby the
null hypothesis could be rejected. Since the two tests rejected the null hypothesis, the data
provided enough evidence that the both decreases in the TPR and the FPR were
statistically significant.

For the significance tests for the differences in the decrease in TPR and FPR
between the training set and the validation set, the p-value of the hypothesis test (9) was 0,
and thereby the null hypothesis could be rejected. The p-value of the hypothesis test (10)
was 0.98404, and thereby the null hypothesis could not be rejected. In other words, the
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data provided enough evidence that the difference in the decrease in TPR between the
training set and the validation set was statistically significant. However, the data did not
provide enough evidence that the difference in the decrease in FPR between the training
set and the validation set statistically significant.

4.3.1.5 The Average Effects of the Iterations
This section calculated the average effect of the four different results produced by
the previous sections. In the table 4.11 below, the average decrease in TPR and FPR in
the training and validation sets by removing the bad keywords is listed. The TPR of the
validation set was much higher than the TPR of the training set.

Table 4.11 The average decrease in TPR and FPR in the training and validation sets by
excluding the bad keywords.
Set

Training set

Validation set

TPR

0.4022 %

1.4712 %

FPR

5.5136 %

5.3877 %

The average decrease in

In order to determine whether the decreases in the table 4.11 were statistically
significant, the hypothesis test was conducted to the four values. The null and alternative
hypotheses are as stated below (11).
H 0 : p 1 = p2

(11)

Ha: p1 ≠ p2,
where p1 = proportion using all actionable words,
p2 = proportion except the bad keywords.
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The p-value of the average decrease in the TPR in the training set was 0.0001, and
the p-values of the other values were less than 0.0001. Therefore, the null hypothesis was
rejected. In other words, the data provided enough evidence that all decreased values
were statistically significant.

In order to see whether the difference of the decrease rate between the training set
and the validation set was statistically significant, the following hypothesis test (12) was
performed.
H 0 : p 1 = p2

(12)

Ha: p1 ≠ p2,
where p1 = proportion of the average decrease in the training set,
p2 = proportion of the average decrease in the validation set.

The p-value of the difference in the decrease in the TPR between the training set
and the validation set was 0.0003, and thereby the null hypothesis was rejected. The pvalue of the difference in the decrease in the FPR between the training set and the
validation set was 0.8756, and thereby the null hypothesis was not rejected. In other
words, the difference in the decrease in the TPR between the training set and the
validation set was statistically different; however, this data did not provide enough
evidence that the difference in the decrease in the FPR between the training set and the
validation set was statistically significant.

69
4.4

Performance Improvement

In the simulation results, it was found that the synsets reached by following the
troponymy links from the synset of the initial actionable verbs were not quite effective in
identifying phishing emails. As seen in the following figures 4.28 and 4.29, the
percentages of used actionable words within the synsets of the initial actionable words
are over 94% in both algorithms. The total numbers of used words within the synsets of
troponym level 1 are only 5.4% in the original algorithm and 5.6% in the expanded
algorithm. None of actionable words within the synsets of troponym level 2, 3, and 4 was
used to detect the phishing email.

100%

94.6%

PhishNet-NLP

90%

(Phishing Corpus)

80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
5.4%

10%
0%
Synset(V)

Troponyms Lv.1 Troponyms Lv.2 Troponyms Lv.3 Troponyms Lv.4
(Synset(V))
(Synset(V))
(Synset(V))
(Synset(V))

Figure 4.28 Percentage of the Synsets of Actionable Words in the Original algorithm with
Phishing Corpus
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100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%

94.4%

Expaned PhishNet-NLP
(Phishing Corpus)

30%
20%
10%
0%

5.6%
Synset(V)

Troponyms Lv.1 Troponyms Lv.2 Troponyms Lv.3 Troponyms Lv.4
(Synset(V))
(Synset(V))
(Synset(V))
(Synset(V))

Figure 4.29 Percentage of the Synsets of Actionable Words in the Expanded algorithm
with Phishing Corpus
When it comes to the legitimate corpus, over 99% of the actionable words came
from the the synset of the initial actionable words, and extremely small number of the
actionable words within the synset of the troponym level 1 were used for testing. Just like
the phishing corpus, any of actionable words within the synsets of troponym level 2, 3,
and 4 was not used. The results are seen below in the figure 4.30 and 4.31.

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

99.5%

PhishNet-NLP
(Legitimate Corpus)

0.5%
Synset(V)

Troponyms Lv.1 Troponyms Lv.2 Troponyms Lv.3 Troponyms Lv.4
(Synset(V))
(Synset(V))
(Synset(V))
(Synset(V))

Figure 4.30 Percentage of the Synsets of Actionable Words in the Original algorithm with
Legitimate Corpus
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100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

99.1%

Expanding PhishNet-NLP
(Legitimate Corpus)

0.9%
Synset(V)

Troponyms Lv.1 Troponyms Lv.2 Troponyms Lv.3 Troponyms Lv.4
(Synset(V))
(Synset(V))
(Synset(V))
(Synset(V))

Figure 4.31 Percentage of the Synsets of Actionable Words in the Expanded algorithm
with Legitimate Corpus

Considering the results, it can be needless processing time to use the synsets of
troponym level 2, 3, and 4 for testing both phishing and legitimate corpora. In fact, the
number of words in the synset dramatically grows as the troponym level increases, and
processing the synsets of troponym level 2, 3, and 4 take a considerable time. The
numbers of words in the synsets used in this study are listed in the following table. In the
table, V refers to the initial actionable words.
Table 4.12 Numbers of Words in Each Synset
Synset

The number of words

Synset(V)

35

Troponyms Lv.1 (Synset(V))

236

Troponyms Lv.2 (Synset(V))

1211

Troponyms Lv.3 (Synset(V))

2825

Troponyms Lv.4 (Synset(V))

4416
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In the modified algorithm, the synsets of troponym level 2, 3, and 4 were
excluded so as to increase the performance. Each processing time by the scope of the
synsets was measured and the results are shown in the table 4.4 below. Each experiment
was conducted with all 12502 emails that consisted of 4558 emails in the phishing corpus
and 7944 emails in the legitimate corpus. The experiment (Synset(V) + Troponyms Lv.1)
only took about 21 minutes; however, the experiment (Synset(V) + Troponyms Lv.1 & 2
& 3 &4) took about 3 hours 50 minutes to examine the data sets.

Table 4.13 The Processing Time by the scope of the Synsets
The scope of the Synsets

The Processing Time

Synset(V) + Troponyms Lv.1

21m 3s 865ms

Synset(V) + Troponyms Lv.1 & 2

54m 48s 869ms

Synset(V) + Troponyms Lv.1 & 2 & 3

2h 13m 25s 767ms

Synset(V) + Troponyms Lv.1 & 2 & 3 &4

3h 49m 48s 356ms
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

5.1

Summary of Research

This thesis explored a method of text-based phishing detection by utilizing natural
language techniques and reported on its results. The proposed algorithms improved upon
the early work called PhishNet-NLP. In the PhishNet-NLP, the phishing detection of text
analysis portion fell behind the other analyses portions. The study focused on the
improvement of text analysis portion in the PhishNet-NLP. The main concept of the
modified algorithm was to expand the scope of the actionable verbs used in the text
analysis. The expansion resulted in the considerably better phishing detection rate than
the rate of the original text analysis in PhishNet-NLP; however, at the same time, the
FPR was somewhat worse since more emphasis on the importance of detecting as many
phishing emails as possible also increases the risk of falsely identifying legitimate text as
phishing.

To ameliorate the increased FPR, the statistical approach was adopted. This idea
came from the different actionable words’ frequency between the phishing corpus and the
legitimate corpus. Since some actionable words called bad keywords here deteriorated the
FPR, it was expected that excluding the actionable words causing the high FPR from the
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list of actionable words would be able to significantly reduce the FPR. The statistical
evaluations using the cross-validation technique concluded that eliminating the bad
keywords decreased both the TPR and the FPR, and the decreased rates were all
statistically significant. Although the significance test evaluated that the decreased TPR
was statistically significant by excluding bad keywords, compared to the considerably
reduced FPR, the TPR only had moderate damage from the trade-off.

When it comes to the time performance, this study was able to shorten the
processing time by not using unused actionable words. Specifically, this modified
algorithm was able to perform over 10 times faster than the original algorithm by
excluding the synsets of troponym level 2, 3, and 4 of actionable words. In the real world,
the processing time can be crucial for the email system where hundreds of thousands of
transactions occur.

5.2

Limitations and Future Work

This study produced fairly improved phishing detection result. Using the difference
in the actionable words’ frequency between the phishing corpus and the legitimate corpus
was a possible suggestion to reduce the FPR; however, the FPR still remains to be
addressed.

One possible way to decrease FPR would be to adopt the fuzzy logic approach. In
this scheme, the standard score used to classify an email was binary that the score 0
indicates a legitimate email, and the score more than 1 refers to phishing email. The word
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scores that were found in the phishing corpus were as follows: 4733 scored 1.0, 8746
scored 1.5 and 870 scored 2.0. For the legitimate corpus, the scores were as follows: 2123
scored 1.0, 67 scored 1.5, and 9 scored 2.0. In the legitimate corpus, 1.0 word scores
mostly increased the FPR. Using the fuzzy logic technique will allow a user to determine
whether to delete the email which is scored 1.0 by the current system. The fuzzy logic
system will be able to inform the user by labeling the 1.0 scored email as to be examined
by user instead of right throwing the email into a spam box.

This study placed an emphasis on finding if there are any patterns in the texts in the
phishing emails which could be distinguishable from legitimate emails. Against the
expectation, any distinguishable pattern in the text was not found. As the main objective
of the future work, it is expected that adding semantic component will reduce the FPR
while preserving or increasing the detection accuracy.
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Appendix A

A full list of stopwords

Figure A 1 The actionable words and counted words for text score
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Appendix B

Jr.
Sr.
Dr.
Prof.
Mr.
Mrs.
Ms.
Miss.
a
about
after
again
against
all
am
an
and
any
are
aren't
as
at
be
because
been

being
both
but
by
can't
cannot
could
couldn't
did
didn't
do
does
doesn't
doing
don't
down
during
each
few
for
from
further
had
hadn't
has

hasn't
have
haven't
having
he
he'd
he'll
he's
her
hers
herself
him
himself
his
how
how's
i
i'd
i'll
i'm
i've
if
is
isn't
it

The list of full stopwords

it's
same
those
its
shan't
through
itself
she
to
let's
she'd
too
me
she'll
until
more
she's
up
most
should
very
mustn't shouldn't was
my
so
wasn't
myself
some
we
no
such
we'd
nor
than
we'll
not
that's
we're
of
the
we've
off
their
were
only
theirs
weren't
or
them
what
other
themselves
what's
ought
then
when
our
these
when's
ours
they
where
ourselves they'd
where's
out
they'll
which
over
they're while
own
they've who

Figure B 1 The list of full stopwords

who's
whom
why
why's
with
won't
would
wouldn't
you
you'd
you'll
you're
you've
your
yours
yourself
yourselves
us
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Appendix C

Standford POS name abbreviations

Figure C 1 Stanford POS name abbreviations

